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Abweichungen gegenüber der ersten Ehe? 
Abstract:  
This paper contributes to our understanding of re-
partnering after divorce in two novel ways. First,
we link patterns of educational assortative mating
after divorce with partner choices in first marriag-
es. Second, our study explicitly includes a mar-
riage market measure that captures education spe-
cific mating opportunities after divorce. We apply
competing risks event history models to a rich,
new data source called “Divorce in Flanders/
Scheiding in Vlaanderen” (N = 2,001). Marriage
market measures are derived from the first wave
of the Belgian Generations and Gender Survey.
Our results indicate that (a) educational homoga-
my is weaker in new matches made after divorce
than in first marriages, (b) women in particular
tend to choose partners being educationally simi-
lar to their first marriage partners, and (c) di-
vorced men are more likely to re-partner with
highly educated women as a result of the in-
creased supply of such singles in the marriage
market. 
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 Zusammnenfassung: 
Dieser Artikel trägt in zweifach neuartiger Hinsicht 
zu unserem Verständnis über erneute Partnerschaf-
ten nach einer Scheidung bei: Erstens verknüpfen 
wir die Muster bildungsbezogener Partnerwahl 
nach der Scheidung mit der Partnerauswahl in Erst-
Ehen. Zweitens enthält unsere Studie ausdrücklich 
ein Messinstrument für den Heiratsmarkt, das bil-
dungsspezifische Partnerwahlopportunitäten nach 
einer Scheidung erfasst. Dabei wenden wir ereig-
nisdatenanalytische Modelle mit konkurrierenden 
Risiken auf eine neue, reichhaltigen Datenquelle 
namens „Divorce in Flanders/Scheiding in Vlaan-
deren“ (N=2.001) an. Die Heiratsmarktmessin-
strumente selbst wurden aus der erste Welle der 
belgischen Generations and Gender Survey abge-
leitet. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass – erstens 
– die Bildungshomogamie bei neuen Partnerwah-
len nach der Scheidung schwächer ausgeprägt ist 
als in Erst-Ehen, dass – zweitens – insbesondere 
Frauen dazu neigen, einen Partner mit einem ih-
rem ersten Ehepartner ähnlichem Bildungsniveau 
zu wählen, und dass – drittens – geschiedene Män-
ner eher dazu neigen, eine neue Partnerschaft mit 
hochgebildeten Frauen einzugehen, was aus dem 
gestiegenen Angebot solcher Singles auf dem Hei-
ratsmarkt resultiert. 
 
Schlagwörter: Scheidung, neue bildungsbezogene 
Partnerschaft, Beziehung zum früheren Ehegatten, 
Partnerschaftsmarktopportunitäten, Survey „Di-
vorce in Flanders“ 
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1. Introduction 
Needs, attractiveness and opportunities are the three most mentioned reasons why people 
enter a new union after a union disruption (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003). Feelings of loneliness 
and deteriorated well-being are very common for people whose first marriage ended. A 
new partnership might fulfill the need for love and companionship and may represent an 
important route out of poverty (Amato 2000; Dewilde/Uunk 2008; Jansen/Mortelmans/ 
Snoeckx 2009). International research has indicated that re-partnering is a selective pro-
cess: among the separated, some are more likely to re-partner than others, probably be-
cause some hold more resources that make them attractive as potential partners. Differ-
ences across age, gender, race/ethnicity, parental status, personality, socioeconomic back-
ground and first marriage experiences have been identified (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003; 
Ivanova/Kalmijn/Uunk 2013; Wu/Schimmele 2005). Yet, this selectivity may not only be 
related to differential needs and attractiveness but also to the opportunities to meet poten-
tial partners (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003).  
Insights into how needs, opportunities, and attractiveness play out on the remarriage 
market cannot only be provided by investigating who is re-partnering. We also need to 
address ‘who re-partners whom?’: which partner choices do people make after divorce? A 
number of studies have already investigated the degree of similarity in higher order un-
ions in terms of education, also in comparison to first unions (Dean/Gurak 1978; Gelissen 
2004; Jacobs/Furstenberg 1986; Shafer 2009, 2013). But there is a lack of research on 
how individual as well as marriage market factors are associated with educational sorting 
outcomes after divorce. 
Research on educational assortative mating after divorce is important for several rea-
sons. First, the stylized facts about educational homogamy are mostly based on studies of 
first marriages while the impact of post-divorce re-partnering on shaping contemporary 
family life has increased tremendously. For example, if higher order unions are less ho-
mogamous than first unions, this may imply that post-divorce mating patterns are making 
social boundaries in family life more permeable (Breen/Andersen 2012; Press 2004; 
Schwartz 2013). Second, since re-partnering has been found to be a major way of coping 
with potentially adverse consequences of divorce, the type of match in terms of his and 
her education (and implied life orientations as well as earning potential) will matter for 
post-divorce wellbeing at least as much as it did during first marriages. Third, the gender 
gap in educational attainment has reversed in Europe (Van Bavel 2012) as well as in the 
US (Buchmann/DiPrete 2006). This reversal is likely to have implications for the connec-
tions between union stability and educational assortative mating which have hardly been 
explored so far.  
We study patterns of educational assortative mating after marital dissolution in Bel-
gium. More precisely, we study re-partnering in the region of Flanders, which is the 
Northern, Dutch-speaking part of the country. We enhance the perspectives of earlier work 
in at least two ways. First, we go beyond the comparison of general trends in educational 
homogamy between first and higher order unions. In fact, we want to estimate educational 
sorting outcomes after divorce of men and women depending on their own, but also their 
previous partner’s level of educational attainment. Do divorced people tend to choose ed-
ucationally similar or dissimilar partners compared to their first marriage partners? And 
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can potential differences be explained by one’s own level of educational attainment? 
Second, we explicitly include a measure of the opportunity to mate assortatively after di-
vorce. Higher educated divorcees may prefer to match with equals, but what happens if 
the number of singles with the same educational attainment is limited? We account for 
this by including time-varying estimates of the number of singles by level of educational 
attainment in our study population.  
2. Background 
2.1 Old and new patterns of educational assortative mating 
During much of the 20th century, the male breadwinner-female homemaker model has domi-
nated the marriage market. This model implied that a high educational level and income po-
tential were attractive features for men in particular while for women a strong commitment to 
the family was considered more important (Becker 1981; Dykstra/Poortman 2010; Sweeney 
1997). This normative model implied that college-educated men outnumbered college-
educated women on the marriage market as well as on the labor market. In terms of educa-
tional assortative mating, it implied female educational hypergamy (women marrying up-
wards) and male educational hypogamy (men marrying downwards) on top of the dominant 
pattern of homogamy (Blossfeld 2009; Kalmijn 1998; Qian 1998; Schwartz/Mare 2005). 
In the meantime, gender roles have changed a lot. Several authors (Beller 2009; 
Dykstra/Poortman 2010; Oppenheimer 1997; Raley/Bratter 2004; Sweeney 2002; Swee-
ney/Cancian 2004) have made the case that women with a high level of educational at-
tainment and high earning potential in the labor market have become more attractive as 
marriage partners. The need for additional income to meet enhanced consumption aspira-
tions has grown. The gainful employment of wives and mothers is reflected in the increas-
ing participation of women in college-level education. Today, in all European countries as 
well as in the United States, even more women than men participate in higher education 
and they are more successful in obtaining a college degree (Buchmann/DiPrete 2006; Van 
Bavel 2012). Van Bavel (2012) argues that this will lead to major shifts in patterns of as-
sortative mating and reproduction, both before and after divorce. Esteve, Garcia-Roman 
and Permanyer (2012) recently showed that female educational hypogamy has already 
become more common than the traditional female hypergamy in a wide range of countries 
where the gender gap in educational attainment has turned around. 
2.2 Opportunities, attractiveness and needs after divorce 
After divorce, people typically face a curtailed marriage market. This is not only because 
they are generally older and the number of single people at higher ages is limited, but also 
because divorcees are less integrated in typical marriage markets such as schools, volun-
tary associations, and leisure locations. Instead, they have a higher chance of meeting new 
spouses at work, in social organizations, through online dating and through informal con-
tacts within the social network (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003, Hitsch/Hortaçsu/Ariely 2010). 
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However, personal and contextual characteristics can stimulate the opportunity to form a 
desirable match after divorce. Highly educated, previously married men, for instance, are 
assumed to have a large pool of potential partners, since they are expected to have estab-
lished a career and be able to support a family (Shafer 2009, 2012; Sweeney 1997). For 
women, in contrast, a negative impact, if any, of socioeconomic status is expected (Shafer 
2009, 2013). Unlike men, women often experience a decrease in their economic well-
being following a divorce (Andreß et al. 2006; Jansen/Mortelmans/Snoeckx 2009). As a 
result, low-resource women may feel more pushed to re-partner than highly educated 
women. Empirically, recent research has found mixed results about the association be-
tween educational attainment and re-partnering for both men and women (de Graaf/Kal-
mijn 2003, Pasteels/Corijn/Mortelmans 2012; Wu/Schimmele 2005). 
The parental status and age at separation are often put forward as more decisive in 
how constrained divorced women are in their opportunities and choices on the remarriage 
market (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003; Shafer 2009). Despite the fact that joint-custody arrange-
ments are on the rise (particularly in our Flemish study population, see Sodermans/ 
Vanassche/Matthijs 2013), women are still more likely to remain the primary caregiver to 
children after divorce (Goldscheider/Sassler 2006; Ono 2005). The presence of children 
implies financial as well as time constraints that affect the needs and opportunities to meet 
a new partner, but these appear to be more salient for women than for men (Beaujouan 
2012; Ivanova/Kalmijn/Uunk 2013). The same holds for age at separation: it has been 
found that even women without children draw from a smaller partner pool than men do, 
because men traditionally exhibit a preference for younger women (England/Farkas 1986; 
Oppenheimer 1988; South 1991).  
If men and women in the remarriage market are evaluated on more traditional charac-
teristics and are more likely to meet potential spouses in educationally less homogeneous 
settings (de Graaf/Kalmijn 2003), heterogamous matches may be more common after di-
vorce than in first marriages. Shafer’s (2009; 2013) results on educational sorting out-
comes in second marriages suggest that remarriage patterns are indeed more traditional 
than contemporary first marriage patterns in the United States: men have the tendency to 
make traditional matches by remarrying younger and less-educated women; women’s re-
marriage prospects and marital sorting outcomes are more influenced by age and social 
background characteristics. This result seems to be in line with the marriage market hy-
pothesis. This hypothesis emphasizes that the pool of potential partners for the divorcees 
is more heterogeneous and smaller in size. Hence, divorced people are more restricted in 
the opportunities of finding a similar partner compared to (younger) people on the first-
marriage market. In contrast, the learning hypothesis emphasizes that divorced people 
will prefer a new partner who is more similar to them. Divorcees learn from the adjust-
ment problems of their often non-homogamous first union, so the argument goes, and be-
come choosier the second time around (Dean/Gurak 1978; Gelissen 2004). A third hy-
pothesis, the remarrying kind hypothesis, starts from the assumption that some people 
may be attracted to mates different from themselves. When they are inclined to marry 
heterogamously and have unstable first marriages, they are also inclined to form hetero-
gamous relationships after divorce (Dean/Gurak 1978). 
Rather than being mutually exclusive, these three hypotheses point to potential mecha-
nisms that can jointly play a role in shaping patterns of assortative mating after divorce. The 
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marriage market hypothesis refers to the opportunities to meet partners with certain charac-
teristics. It implies that educational assortative mating after divorce can be affected by the 
number of potential new partners with a given level of educational attainment. Past research 
on the transition to first marriage already found convincing evidence that marriage market 
opportunities, measured by person-specific sex ratios, are related to not only the likelihood 
of marriage, but also to the ‘quality’ of the spouse in the event of marriage (Lew-
is/Oppenheimer 2000; Lichter/Anderson/Hayward 1995). The learning hypothesis implies 
that some people avoid the kind of matches made in their first marriages when they choose 
a new partner. To the extent that this applies to a large group of divorcees, we would expect 
to see little continuity in partner choices from first marriages to higher order unions. The 
remarrying kind hypothesis, in contrast, would imply more continuity from first marriages 
to higher order unions.  
Finally, we have to state that also assigned characteristics, besides achieved characte-
ristics, may influence union decisions after divorce. Some recent European studies found that 
assortative mating is still affected by one’s social origin (Blossfeld/Timm 2003). So, even 
when the formation of higher-order unions takes place in later stages of the life course, peo-
ple still may be affected by their parents’ background in choosing a preferred partner after a 
marital separation. After all, socio-economic differences between groups of parents function 
as barriers between social circles (Blossfeld/Timm 2003; Musick/Brand/Davis 2012).  
3. Method 
3.1 Data 
We use data from the survey Divorce in Flanders/Scheiding in Vlaanderen (DiF) (Mortel-
mans et al. 2012), collected in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium in 2009 and 2010. We 
examine the re-partnering of legally divorced men and women who separated between 
1980 and 2005 (n = 3836) and who were in their first post-divorce relationship in Decem-
ber 2007 or never entered a new relationship at all (n = 2404). In the DiF survey, re-
spondents were interviewed about their own, their first marriage partner’s, and their cur-
rent new partner’s (if any) level of educational attainment. We do not know the education 
level of all post-divorce partners. For this reason, people with a broken post-divorce rela-
tionship or people who are currently in a relationship with their second, third or higher 
post-divorce partner could not be included in our analyses (n = 1194, 31.1%).  
We further excluded 214 persons (5.5%) with incomplete or invalid information about 
their post-divorce relationship trajectories and 24 persons (0.6%) who re-partnered with 
someone of the same sex. Finally, after also excluding cases with missing data on our explana-
tory variables, our samples include 911 men and 1090 women, or 47746 and 66197 person-
months, respectively. Post-stratification weights ensure that the samples are representative by 
the year of marriage and every five-year legal divorce cohort (Pasteels et al. 2012).  
In order to estimate the monthly number of singles with a given level of educational 
attainment, we use data of the Flemish population from the Belgian Generations and Gen-
der Survey (GGS) (De Winter et al. 2011; Vikat et al. 2007), a large scale survey that was 
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organized during the period 2008-2010. We limited the GGS data to Flanders because the 
marriage market in Belgium is strongly defined in linguistic terms: the number of matches 
between Francophones (living in the Southern half of the country) and Dutch-speaking Bel-
gians (in the North) is very limited (Billiet/Maddens/Frognier 2006). The final sample con-
sists of 1860 men and 2000 women. More details about the constructed measures are dis-
cussed next.  
3.2 Measures 
Education. Our models include the actual levels of educational attainment of the respon-
dent and the former spouse as explanatory variables and the actual level of education of 
the new partner, if re-partnered, in the dependent variable. Levels of educational attain-
ment were coded using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 
(UNESCO 2012). We collapsed the 6 ISCED classes into 3 categories so that a low edu-
cational level corresponds to the ISCED codes 0-2 (i.e., lower secondary education at 
most), a medium educational level to the ISCED codes 3-4 (i.e., post-secondary but not 
tertiary; i.e. high school finished but not college) and a high educational level to the 
ISCED codes 5-6 (i.e., tertiary education finished at bachelor or master level).  
 
Mating market opportunities. In order to take into account the quantitative constraints in 
potential matches of the opposite sex, we estimated the number of singles by level of edu-
cation based on GGS. For each GGS respondent, we were able to determine which partner 
status she or he had in every month after age 18. Being single could mean that the re-
spondent (a) never had a partner before, (b) had no partner after a breakup, or (c) had no 
partner after widowhood. We calculated the number of singles aged 25 to 50 years in every 
month between January, 1980 and December, 2007. The proportion of DiF respondents 
who re-partnered outside this age frame is negligible (3.5% before the age of 25 and 2.7% 
after the age of 50). Previous research has shown that wide age ranges perform better than 
narrow age ranges for defining marriage markets (Fossett/Kiecolt 1991). 
Our estimates indicate that the number of singles has risen over time until about the 
year 1998; afterwards the number of singles declined somewhat but remained relatively 
stable (see Pasteels/Lodewijckx/Mortelmans 2013 for more details). These estimates fit 
well with official statistics from Statistics Belgium – we cannot use the latter in the analy-
sis because they do not jointly distinguish between level of educational attainment as well 
as marital status. Among singles, the proportion of low educated men sharply declined 
over time. Both the proportion of medium and highly educated men in the population of 
adult singles increased, but towards the end of the observation period there was a slight de-
crease in the proportion of highly educated single men. We speculate that this may be ex-
plained by the fact that college graduates are desirable matches on the mating market, so 
few of them remain single even after divorce. Among single women, the proportion of col-
lege graduates remained relatively high during the whole observation period. Just as like 
the male respondents, there was a decreasing proportion of low-educated single women.  
The absolute numbers of singles were included as varying by calendar month. For 
female re-partnering, the male number of singles by education was entered in the equa-
tion; for male re-partnering, the female number of singles was used. 
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of explanatory variables 
Men Women 
M SD M SD 
Educational level respondent (low) 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 
 Medium  0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 
 High 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 
Educational level former partner (low) 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.46 
 Medium  0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 
 High 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 
n low educated single men TV (39-66) - - 51.21 7.69 
n medium educated single men TV (21-83) - - 64.42 15.72 
n highly educated single men TV (17-83) - - 65.41 14.53 
n low educated single women TV (23-45) 37.96 3.61 - - 
n medium educated single women TV (16-58) 48.79 8.38 - - 
n highly educated single women TV (22-94) 69.87 18.4 - - 
Separation cohort (1980-1989) 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 
 1990-1999 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49 
 2000-2005 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50 
Age at separation (≤30) 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 
 31-40 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50 
 ≥41 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.39 
Occupational status TV (full-time) 0.95 0.22 0.62 0.48 
 Part-time  0.04 0.10 0.23 0.42 
 Unemployed 0.01 0.20 0.15 0.35 
Co-residential child(ren) TV (no co-residential child) 0.57 0.50 0.26 0.44 
 1 co-residential child 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.45 
 2 or more co-residential children 0.24 0.43 0.45 0.50 
Duration first marriage (0-36) 13.77 7.50 13.77 7.40 
Cohabitated prior to marriage  0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43 
Educational level parents (low) 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 
 Medium  0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 
 High  0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 
Religiousness (0-10) 3.73 2.86 4.44 2.73 
Degree of boundary ambiguity (20-64) 26.08 4.90 26.89 5.40 
n 911 1090 
Notes: TV = time-varying variable. For categorical variables, the reference category is between brackets. 
For metric variables, the range is between brackets. For time-varying variables, the descriptive refers to 
the month in which the respondent got separated (t = 0). 
  
Control variables. We include two time variables: age at separation and separation cohort. 
Socioeconomic background indicators and first marriage characteristics are measured by 
(a) the time-varying variables occupational status (whether the respondent works 95% or 
more, works less than 95% or is unemployed) and parental status (number of co-
residential children from the first marriage), and (b) the time-constant variables ‘cohabita-
tion prior to marriage’, ‘first marriage duration’ (in years) and ‘parent’s actual education’ 
(if one parent was lower educated than the other, we maintained the educational level of 
the highest educated parent). Finally, we also control for how religious someone feels (on 
a scale from 0 to 10) and his or her degree of boundary ambiguity (based on the Boundary 
Ambiguity Scale compiled and operationalized by Boss/Greenberg/Pearce-McCall 1990) 
at the time of interview. A high degree of boundary ambiguity means that the divorced 
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respondent still feels closely attached to his or her former partner. Means and standard 
deviations of all explanatory variables are reported in Table 1. 
3.3 Analytic strategy 
As a first descriptive step, in order to see whether the degree of educational homogamy in 
higher order unions is weaker or stronger than in first marriages, we calculate Cohen’s 
Kappa coefficient. Kappa is a measure of correlation suitable for categorical variables, 
like our education variables. It ranges from 0 (no association) to 1 (perfect association). 
Next, we turn to regression modeling to investigate factors associated with post-divorce 
educational sorting. 
Most research on assortative mating patterns has applied log-linear analysis to contin-
gency tables that contain the observed frequencies in the joint distribution of variables 
measuring spousal characteristics. An important limitation of that approach is that people 
who have not (yet) entered a new union during our observation period cannot be included. 
As re-partnering is a selective process, this is a crucial drawback for our purposes. There-
fore we use event history models instead of log-linear models. 
More specifically, we estimate competing risks discrete-time event history models for the 
transition to a new educational assortative co-residential union, using a multinomial logistic 
specification for that purpose (Mills 2011; Scott/Kennedy 2005). Since people on top and at 
the bottom of the ladder of educational attainment cannot mate upwards or downwards, re-
spectively, we model the rate of entering a new cohabitation with a partner who is low, me-
dium, or highly educated rather than categorizing the outcome variable as “homogamous”, 
“hypogamous”, or “hypergamous”. Post-divorce co-residential unions are defined to include 
married as well as unmarried cohabitation. We did not focus on the transition to formal sec-
ond marriages because the marriage propensity of divorced people has fallen sharply in our 
study population (Pasteels/Lodewijckx/Mortelmans 2013). We have carried out separate 
analyses of formal marriages and the results are in line with what is reported here.  
We model duration dependency by means of a piecewise constant hazard approach 
(Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002), allowing yearly time splines for the first 4 years after the actual 
separation (rather than formal divorce) because then the hazard differentiates the most. 
After the 4th year, we apply broader splines because the hazard doesn’t change very much 
from year to year. Right censoring is introduced when respondents remained single till the 
end of the observation period or during a period of 20 years. 
We go beyond earlier work by explicitly accounting for quantitative constraints in the 
re-partnering market to mate assortatively. We do this by estimating the number of singles 
with a given level of educational attainment in the relevant population for every month 
during our study period. These monthly estimates are then introduced in our hazard mod-
els as explanatory variables. The basic outline of our models is as follows: 
 
In equation (1), htij is the hazard rate at month t for individual i to mate a partner whose 
level of educational attainment equals j. The reference category in our multinomial logit is 
the probability that there is no re-partnering at all, which is the complement of the hazard 
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rates summed over all three categories of educational attainment. α0j is a fixed intercept, 
estimated separately for each level of partner’s level of education, while vector α1j speci-
fies how the baseline hazard rate varies over the time spells mt. Vector xi contains indi-
vidual level time constant variables, vector zit represents the time-varying characteristics, 
and vector st incorporates the numbers of singles by level of education per time unit. 
4. Results 
Table 2 describes the association between own educational attainment of men and women 
on the one hand and their former and new partners (if any) on the other hand. The Kappa 
measures of agreement indicate that homogamy is stronger in first marriages (“Former 
partner’s education”) than in new unions (“New partner’s education”). Column percent-
ages indicate that new unions are more often upward bound, except for the highly educat-
ed, whose educational homogamy is reinforced in their new unions. So, if divorcees enter 
new unions, they go for a better party, in terms of educational attainment, than they did in 
their first marriages. This holds for women as well as for men. The following regression 
analyses will shed light on the factors associated with educational sorting after divorce. 
 
Table 2:  Weighted counts, column percentages, and kappa measures of agreement 
between level of education of the respondent and level of education of the 
former partner or new partner 
 Men’s education  Women’s education 
 Low Medium   High  Low Medium High 
 n % n % n %  n % n % n % 
Full samplea:              
Former partner’s education              
Low  155 65.1 103 27.8 27 8.8  154 63.9 126 29.0 43 10.1 
Medium  64 26.9 198 53.4 92 30.1  76 31.5 248 57.0 61 33.7 
High 19 8.0 70 18.9 187 61.1  11 4.6 61 14.0 240 56.2 
κ [95 % CI] .38* [.36, .40]  .37* [.35, .38] 
Re-partnerd sampleb:              
Former partner’s education              
Low  110 70.5 64 24.2 18 8.3  94 64.4 74 27.0 31 12.1 
Medium  33 21.2 152 57.6 64 29.4  46 31.5 164 59.9 93 36.3 
High 13 8.3 48 18.2 136 62.4  6 4.1 36 13.1 132 51.6 
κ [95 % CI] .43* [.41, .45]  .36* [.34, .38] 
New partner’s education              
Low  70 45.2 46 17.4 10 4.6  67 45.9 71 25.8 30 11.7 
Medium  59 38.1 126 47.7 65 30.0  62 42.5 151 54.9 85 33.2 
High 26 16.8 92 34.8 142 65.4  17 11.6 53 19.3 141 55.1 
κ [95 % CI] .28* [.26, .29]  .28* [.26, .29] 
a Unweigted nmen = 911 and nwomen = 1090. b Unweighted nmen = 624, nwomen = 659.*  p < .001 
Note: CI = confidence interval. We did not find any significant trend across the separation cohorts. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report regression parameters for re-partnering after separation for men and 
women, respectively. In each of the tables, the first column reports estimates for a hazard 
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model for entry into cohabitation, irrespective of the level of education of the new part-
ner: these estimates refer to a binary logistic specification of the hazard model. The three 
last columns of each table contain the results of the competing risk models of educational 
sorting, with not re-partnered as the reference category.  
 
Table 3:  Exponentiated coefficients for predictors of men’s re-partnering after separation 
(weighted coefficients, unweighted N) 
  Re-partnered a woman who is 
 Re-partnered Low 
educated 
Medium 
educated 
Highly 
educated 
Explanatory variables  Versus not re-partnered 
Intercept 0.04*** 0.01** 0.03** 0.00*** 
Duration since separation (0–12 months)     
 13–24 months 0.72** 0.67 0.62** 0.88 
 25–36 months 0.55*** 0.28** 0.48** 0.81 
 37–48 months 0.60*** 0.50* 0.52** 0.78 
 49–84 months 0.30*** 0.35** 0.23*** 0.36*** 
 85–120 months 0.25*** 0.27** 0.22*** 0.28*** 
 121–240 months 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
Educational level respondent (low)     
 Medium  1.12 0.57** 1.39* 2.04** 
 High 1.38* 0.27*** 1.20 3.97*** 
Educational level former partner (low)     
 Medium  1.03 0.53** 1.61** 1.02 
 High 1.01 0.62 1.07 1.18 
n low educated single women TV 1.00 0.98 1.01 1.00 
n medium educated single women TV 1.00 1.04 0.99 1.01 
n highly educated single women TV 1.02** 1.01 1.02† 1.03** 
Separation cohort (1980–1989)     
 1990–1999 0.82 0.56 1.18 0.71 
 2000–2005 0.76 0.65 1.29 0.49† 
Age at separation (≤ 30)     
 31–40 0.90 1.04 0.71* 1.13 
 ≥ 41 0.57** 0.46† 0.56* 0.74 
Occupational status TV (full-time)     
 Part-time  1.89* 1.72 0.81 3.41*** 
 Unemployed 0.71† 0.52 1.02 0.57 
Co-residential child(ren) TV (none)     
 1 0.77* 0.89 0.73† 0.68† 
 2 or more  0.51*** 0.56† 0.31*** 0.70* 
Duration first marriage 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.99 
Cohabitated prior to marriage (no) 1.07 0.76 1.13 1.17 
Educational level parents (low)     
 Medium  1.16 0.69 0.91 1.80*** 
 High 0.98 0.17* 0.82 1.61** 
Religiousness  1.00 1.04 1.02 0.96† 
Degree of boundary ambiguity  0.93*** 0.96† 0.92*** 0.92*** 
Number of person-months 47746  47746  
Number of events 624 125 245 254 
χ2 of all coefficients (df) 313.66 (27)  547.57(81)  
† < 0.10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
Note: TV = time-varying variable. The reference category is between brackets.  
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Table 4:  Exponentiated coefficients for predictors of women’s re-partnering after 
separation (weighted coefficients, unweighted N) 
  Re-partnered a man who is 
 Re-partnered Low 
educated 
Medium 
educated 
Highly 
educated 
Independent variables Versus not re-partnered 
Intercept 0.10*** 0.05** 0.69** 0.00*** 
Duration since separation (0–12 months)     
 13‒24 months 0.50*** 0.47** 0.49*** 0.54** 
 25–36 months 0.56*** 0.51** 0.50*** 0.73 
 37–48 months 0.48*** 0.36** 0.43*** 0.69 
 49–84 months 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 
 85–120 months 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.05*** 0.35** 
 121–240 months 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.19*** 
Educational level respondent (low)     
 Medium  0.97 0.74 1.05 1.47† 
 High 0.97 0.50** 0.70† 3.18*** 
Educational level former partner (low)    
 Medium  0.96 0.62** 1.14 1.53 
 High 0.85 0.25*** 0.78 2.03** 
n low educated single men TV 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
n medium educated single men TV 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 
n highly educated single men TV 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 
Separation cohort (1980–1989)     
 1990–1999 0.98 0.85 0.77 1.54 
 2000–2005 1.15 1.12 1.07 1.40 
Age at separation (≤ 30)     
 31–40 0.67*** 0.62* 0.69* 0.73 
 ≥ 41 0.50** 0.60 0.49* 0.46* 
Occupational status TV (full-time)     
Part-time  1.06 0.98 1.24 0.91 
Unemployed 0.89 1.32 0.79 0.64 
Co-residential child(ren) TV (none)     
 1 0.61*** 0.65* 0.58*** 0.63** 
 2 or more  0.55*** 0.68† 0.61** 0.35*** 
Duration first marriage 0.98† 0.98 0.96* 1.01 
Cohabitated prior to marriage (no) 0.98 0.67† 1.09 1.03 
Educational level parents (low)     
 Medium  0.92 0.90 0.86 1.06 
 High 1.11 0.82 0.97 1.42† 
Religiousness  1.00 1.02 0.98 1.01 
Degree of boundary ambiguity  0.97** 0.97† 0.96** 0.99 
Number of person-months 66197  66197  
Number of events 659 164 291 204 
χ2 of all coefficients (df) 478.36 (27)  729.07 (81)  
† < 0.10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Note: TV = time-varying variable. The reference category is between brackets. 
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The coefficients of the educational level of the respondent confirm the tendency for ho-
mogamy after divorce, even if the Kappa coefficients indicated such tendency to be 
weaker than in first marriages. Highly educated women have a significantly lower risk of 
re-partnering with a low or medium educated man compared to low educated women. 
Conversely, they have a significantly higher risk of re-partnering with a highly educated 
man compared to low educated women. Next to that, medium educated women have a sig-
nificantly higher risk of re-partnering a highly educated man compared to low educated 
women (Table 4, column 2 to 4). The same pattern of educational sorting holds for men 
(Table 3, column 2 to 4), but in their case there is a statistically significant, positive effect of 
being highly educated on the overall re-partnering rate (Table 3, column 1). This is largely 
due to the relatively high chances of re-partnering a highly educated woman. For women, 
there is no effect of own education on the overall rate of re-partnering (Table 4, column 1). 
Net of the effect of the own education, the education of the former partner is clearly 
associated with educational assortative re-partnering, which is suggestive of continuities 
from first marriages to higher order unions. Divorced women have a significantly lower 
tendency of re-partnering with a low educated man if their previously marriage partner 
was at least medium educated (especially when their first marriage partner was highly ed-
ucated). Conversely, the chances of matching with a highly educated man are higher for 
women whose former partners were also highly educated (Table 4, column 2 to 4). For 
men, the educational level of the former partner makes a statistically significant differ-
ence only if she was medium educated: men with medium educated wives in their first 
marriages are more likely to match with a medium educated woman also in their new 
unions, and less likely to match with a low educated woman (Table 3, column 2 to 4). The 
other point estimates are much weaker for men than for women and statistically not sig-
nificant. So, for women, the education of the former partner is a better predictor of the 
education of the future partner than it is for men. 
These differences are illustrated on a more intuitive scale in Figure 1, which show the 
model-predicted proportions of being re-partnered with a low, medium or highly educated 
man or woman within 5 years after separation for prototypical women and men (see note), 
respectively. The subpanels of the figure are arranged by educational attainment of the re-
spondent (see black strips). The horizontal axes within each subpanel refer to the level of 
education of the former partner. Part A presents the probabilities in which the prototypical 
men and women re-partner someone with a similar educational level. Part B shows the 
probability of being re-partnered with a dissimilar man or woman. In general, the pattern of 
homogamy is the strongest among the college-educated. The continuity from first marriages 
to higher order unions stands out most clearly among highly educated women: college-
educated women who were married homogamously the first time are much more likely to 
re-partner with a college-educated man again after divorce, while college-educated women 
who were married with a low educated man, quite often repeat that pattern of hypogamy in 
their new union. In contrast, highly educated men who were with a low educated wife in 
their first marriage are just as likely to form new unions with highly educated women as are 
men who already matched with highly educated women at the first time (Figure 1, Part A). 
The degree of heterogamy is considerably high among the low and medium educated. 
For example, low educated women are at least as likely to re-partner a medium educated 
man as to re-partner homogamously. For low educated men, the chance to re-partner a 
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medium educated woman is also quite high, while medium educated men have a remark-
ably high chance to re-partner heterogamously with a highly educated woman (Figure 1, 
Part B). 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of new unions within 5 years after separation (vertical axes), by 
gender (rows), own education (subpanels), and level of education of the former 
partner (horizontal axes within subsamples) 
A. Homogamous unions 
B. Heterogamous unions 
Note: The proportions were estimated for prototypical men and women: separated between 1990-1999, 
31-40 years old when they got separated, work full-time, have no co-residential children from first mar-
riage, did not cohabit with their former partner prior to marriage, have equally educated parents and have 
a mean value on first marriage duration, mating market opportunities, the religiousness scale and the 
boundary ambiguity scale. 
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We tested interaction effects between the educational levels of the respondent and the 
former partner on the risk to re-partner a man or woman with a specific level of education 
(results not shown). None of these were significant. So, it looks like it is not so much the 
pattern of homogamy or heterogamy that exhibits persistence from the first marriage to 
the next union, but rather the preference for a partner with a given level of education. As 
said, this persistence holds for women in particular. Men more often make different 
choices in their new unions. 
The number of potential new mates by level of education affects re-partnering rates 
for men, but not for women. A high number of highly educated single women in the 
population increases men’s overall risk of re-partnering (Table 3, column 1). More partic-
ularly, it enhances their chances to re-partner with highly educated women (Table 3, col-
umn 4).  
Some of the controls reveal interesting results, too. The level of education of the par-
ents, for example, turns out to be more significant for men than for women. Men with 
parents who are at least medium or highly educated, for instance, have a significantly 
higher risk of re-partnering a highly educated woman than men with low educated parents 
(Table 3, column 4). For women, the education of the parents hardly has an effect, net of 
the own level of education (Table 4). 
In contrast to what is often believed (and found recently by Ivanova/Kalmijn/Uunk 
2013), having co-resident children is not just an obstacle to re-partner for women. In our 
study population, it is about as much an obstacle for men. Having co-resident children is 
mainly an obstacle for matching with a medium or highly educated man (Table 4) or 
woman (Table 3).  
In line with previous research, unemployed men are less likely to re-partner than full-
time working men (Table 3, column 1) while women’s re-partnering chances are not af-
fected by their occupation status (Table 4). Unexpected, however, is the finding that 
working part-time is positively associated with re-partnering rates for men. Part-time 
working men exhibit significantly higher re-partnering rates not just compared to unem-
ployed men (which was expected), but also compared to full time working men (which 
represents, we think, a novel finding). Moreover, it turns out that the significant positive 
effect of working part-time on the rate of men’s entry into cohabiting unions can be fully 
allocated to the high relative risk ratio (3.41) of part-time working men for starting to co-
habit with highly educated women (Table 3, column 4).  
5. Conclusion and discussion 
Contemporary family life is to a large extent also shaped by post-divorce (assortative) re-
partnering. If higher order unions are less homogamous than first unions, for example, 
this may imply that post-divorce mating patterns are making social boundaries in family 
life more permeable than is often assumed. The type of match in terms of his and her edu-
cation may affect post-divorce wellbeing at least as much as it does in first marriages. 
However, in order to explain patterns of post-divorce assortative mating, we have to take 
into account that the gender gap in educational attainment has reversed in Europe as well 
as in the US. This results in a new kind of education-specific marriage and mating 
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squeeze, which is expected to have implications for union stability (Schwartz/Han 2014) 
as well as for post-divorce assortative mating (Van Bavel 2012). To our knowledge, this 
study was the first to include a measure of post-divorce mating market opportunities 
while at the same time linking educational assortative mating in first marriages with the 
patterns observed in post-divorce unions. 
The results of our first descriptive analysis, employing Kappa (a simple measure of 
association for categorical variables), suggest that post-divorce unions are indeed less 
homogamous than first marriages, at least in Flanders (Belgium). Subsequent regression 
analyses showed that heterogamy is particularly more common among the low and medium 
educated, while homogamy remains strongest among the highly educated. This confirms 
Smits’s (2003) finding on first marriages that there is a relatively high degree of social 
closure among the higher educated.  
The weakest homogamy was found among the least educated. For example, low edu-
cated women are at least as likely to re-partner a medium educated man as to re-partner 
homogamously. Low educated women may be looking for better educated partners in or-
der to compensate for the economic disadvantages of a divorce. During marriage, many 
women leave the labor market in order to take care of kids. It has been shown that, after 
divorce, especially for low educated women, re-partnering may be a more effective strat-
egy to overcome financial problems than to try (re-)entering the labor market (Jansen/ 
Mortelmans/Snoeckx 2009). Medium educated men in particular have a remarkably high 
chance to re-partner upwards with a college-educated woman. This may be related both to 
men’s preference for younger women and to the reversal of the gender gap in education: 
in younger cohorts, the overall level of education is higher than in older cohorts, particu-
larly among women. Medium-educated men may be attractive partners for highly educat-
ed women who do not find enough highly educated matches in the mating market (Van 
Bavel 2012). All this implies that low educated divorced women re-partner in a more 
‘traditional’, hypergamous way than in contemporary homogamous first marriages, while 
low and medium educated divorced men more often deviate from the traditional pattern 
by mating up. 
Our findings about the effect of the number of potential partners with a given educa-
tion reinforce the previous interpretation. We found that, for men, a high number of high-
ly educated single women in the population increases the overall risk of re-partnering 
with highly educated women. This effect is robust, net of the effect of the own level of 
educational attainment, and can also explain part of the weakening of homogamy in high-
er order unions: the opportunities to meet more highly educated women have expanded 
tremendously. For the other numbers of men and women’s potential partners, we found 
no statically significant effects, suggesting that preferences may play a bigger role in the 
process of assortative re-partnering than availability. On the other hand, it might be that 
marriage market constraints have just little to do with the willingness to re-partner heter-
ogamously or that marriage market constraints on other traits (like income or occupation) 
matters more when evaluating a potential mate (Lichter/Anderson/Hayward 1995).  
The first marriage partner’s educational level is also associated with partner choices 
after separation, but this holds more for women than for men. Especially women’s risk to 
re-partner a low, medium or highly educated man was positively correlated with having 
been previously married with a low, medium or highly educated man, respectively. Neither 
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for women nor for men, we found evidence that the pattern of homogamy or heterogamy 
(as an interaction between the own and former partner’s education) persists from first 
marriage to the next union.  
Men’s post-divorce assortative mating is more affected by the level of education of 
their parents than the educational level of the former partner. We speculate that this is in-
dicative for the continuing importance of social class for assortative mating, even after di-
vorce. Men more often than women return to live with their parents after divorce, at least 
in our study population (Jappens/Wijckmans/Van Bavel 2011). As the parental education-
al level is strongly associated with the social networks of the family origin (Blossfeld/ 
Timm 2003; Musick/Brand/Davis 2012), this may stimulate the opportunity to meet po-
tential partners of the same educational level as the parents.  
Finally, we unexpectedly found that part-time working divorced men are more likely 
to match with highly educated women than both unemployed and full-time working men. 
The finding that unemployed men seem to be less attractive on the re-partnering market is 
in line with earlier studies, but the positive effect of part-time work is new. A speculative 
explanation for this finding is that highly educated, divorced women may be attracted to 
men who are not fully committed to their jobs but leave room for family engagements and 
domestic chores. Given that our finding appeared to be very robust against alternative 
model specifications, we think that this merits further research using alternative data-
bases. 
6. Limitations 
A limitation of this contribution is that we could only investigate people from dissolved 
formal first marriages and not from dissolved unmarried cohabiting unions. Future re-
search will have to see whether our results can be generalized to people from dissolved 
unmarried cohabitations. However, we expect that the conclusions would remain largely 
the same, since studies comparing patterns of educational homogamy between marital and 
cohabiting unions (regardless of their parity) show none or only small differences (Black-
well/Lichter 2004; Schwartz 2010). The reverse might be true for differences across 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Till now, researchers found small to large differences 
in educational matching by couple type (Jepsen/Jepsen 2002; Schwartz/Graf 2009). Since 
we did our analyses only on opposite-sex couples, our results might not be extended to 
same-sex couples. 
Our sample excludes, by design, people who experienced more than one formal di-
vorce. In addition, we could only analyze first higher order unions that were still intact at 
the time of interview (since we had no information on the partner’s education otherwise). 
As a result of these two selection criteria, we expect that the most unstable post-divorce 
matches will be underrepresented in our sample. Unstable matches may be more common 
among heterogamous ones (Schwartz/Han 2014), so we may still be underestimating the 
degree of heterogamy in second unions. If anything, this would reinforce our conclusion 
that post-divorce unions are less often homogamous than first marriages. On the other 
hand, this also means that we should interpret our estimates of the absolute degree of edu-
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cational homogamy and heterogamy in post-divorce relationships with caution. Still, our 
results of how partner choices after divorce are conditioned by the own educational level 
as well as the educational level of the former partner are very robust. 
We encourage other scholars to include measures of education-specific marriage market 
opportunities into their equations, even if they are crude ones. Given the limitations of the 
available data, we were able to calculate the number of singles during the desired observa-
tion period within the age range of 25 to 50 years. An even broader age range may have 
been preferable. Or, alternatively, it could be advisable to experiment with age-specific 
measures of available partners in the mating pool. Indeed, one can argue that divorced 
women and men who are 30 years old have a different mating pool (with respect to age) 
than divorcees who are, say, 40 years old. Making the age bounds of the marriage market a 
function of the respondent’s own age may be a better approach, but the samples we used 
were too small to allow such fine-tuned approach in a reliable way. We preferred to include 
absolute numbers of education-specific single men and women above the more convention-
al sex ratios. We believe that our approach better captures the quantum of potential oppo-
site-sex partners with given educational attainment, the drawback is that our measures do 
not account for the competition by same-sex singles. Also, we were not able to refine our 
marriage market measure along more fine-tuned geographic lines within the region of Flan-
ders (for example by accounting for rural/urban differences, or differences by province). 
Still, we think that Flanders is compact and homogeneous enough (for example in terms of 
language) to be treated as a meaningful geographic unit for union formation. 
Finally, we need to state that competing risks analyses are not without problem. The 
fundamental non-informativeness assumption of the competing risks method expects 
competing risks to be independent: the occurrence of each competing event may not be 
informative for all others (Singer/Willett 2003). We suspect our competing events to cor-
relate and subsequently violate the assumption. The risk of re-partnering a low or medium 
educated man or woman might, for example, be high if the chance of meeting a highly 
educated person is low because of mating market constraints (e.g., no single highly edu-
cated men and women on the mating market). However, we tried to minimize the bias on 
our results by taking into account the appropriate independent covariates, including the 
educational composition of the mating market. To the extent that the conditional compet-
ing risks are still correlating after these controls, our estimates may not be consistent. 
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